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Voluntary Dismissals and the Savings Statute:
Has Rule 41(A) Changed the Law?
J. Patrick Browne*
P RIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE NEW Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure,
it had been held that a suit voluntarily dismissed could not be
refiled under the provisions of the savings statute. Ohio Civil Rule
41(A) replaced the prior Code section providing for voluntary dis-
missals and, by its language, suggested that at least one refiling of
the suit would be permitted under the savings statute. However, the
one reported judicial decision squarely on point at the time of this
writing, Brookman v. Northern Trading Co.,' rejects the apparent
purpose of Rule 41 (A) and adheres to the pre-Rule view of the law.
This article will examine the arguments made in support of that
decision, and will find them unpersuasive. It will conclude with the
suggestion that Rule 41 (A) has indeed changed the law.
The Problem
The essential problem can be stated rather simply: plantiff files
his action well within the statute of limitations. Then, after the
statute has run, he files a notice of voluntary dismissal without prej-
udice. Within the year following the voluntary dismissal, he attempts
to refile the action, and is met with a motion to dismiss under Rule
12 (B) (6) on the ground that the action had not been brought within
the time permitted by law. What result?
The answer depends, at least in part, on the interpretation of
section 2305.19 of the Revised Code - the savings statute. In perti-
nent part, that section reads:
In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced ....
if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, and the
time limited for the commencement of such action at the date
of reversal or failure has expired, the plaintiff . . . may
commence a new action within one year after such date.
Thus, the question comes to this: is a voluntary dismissal with-
out prejudice a "failure otherwise than upon the merits"?
The Pre-Rule Solution
The pre-Rule decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court have con-
centrated on the word "fail" almost to the exclusion of the remainder
of the phrase: "otherwise than upon the merits." In early considera-
* B.S. John Carroll Univ.; M.S.L.S., Case-Western Reserve Univ.; J. D., Univ. of Detroit;
Member of Ohio and Michigan Bars; Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University
College of Law.
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tion of the problem, the Court concluded that a voluntary dismissal
could not be a "failure" as the word was properly understood, 2 and
with but one momentary hesitation,3 the Court has adhered to that
view,4 albeit with some qualification as to when a dismissal is truly
"voluntary."5 Thus a summary of the pre-Rule law of Ohio reveals
that a voluntary dismissal of an action is not a failure of that action
as that term is used in Ohio Revised Code section 2305.19, unless that
dismissal follows, and is motivated by, an "adverse ruling" of the
trial court which prevents the dismissing party from going forward
2 Siegfried v. New York, L.E., & W.R.R., 50 Ohio St. 294, 34 N.E. 331 (1893), the
Supreme Court held:
To fail implies an effort or purpose to succeed. One cannot, properly, be said
to fail in anything he does not undertake, nor, in an undertaking which he
voluntarily abandons. . . . [A] failure in the action, by the plaintiff, otherwise
than upon the merits, imports some action by the court, by which the plaintiff is
defeated without a trial upon the merits .... A dismissal by the plaintiff, involves
no action of the court; it is a voluntary withdrawal of his case, and is not a failure
in the action.
3In Cero Realty Corp. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 82, 167 N.E.2d
774 (1960), the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its action after demurrers to its amended
petition had been sustained. The demurrers were grounded on improper joinder of
defendants. The Supreme Court permitted a refiling under the savings statute, holding
that the voluntary dismissal was the equivalent of a failure since the ruling of the trial
court was such that plaintiff could not go forward with the action, and the only alternative
to a voluntary dismissal was an entry of dismissal by the court. Further, since the reason
for the voluntary dismissal was a ruling on a technical point of procedure (misjoinder of
parties) rather than on a substantive issue, the voluntary dismissal was "otherwise than
upon the merits." So far, the decision is in harmony with Siegfried, but the Court went
on to add the following dictum taken from Annot., 86 A.L.R. 1033, 1051 (1933):
It has never been questioned that an involuntary or compulsory nonsuit is within
the meaning of the statute and gives the plaintiff the right to bring a new action
within the time prescibed thereafter, but the claim has been made that a voluntary
nonsuit is not such a nonsuit as the statute contemplates. However, it has been
held almost without exception that such a construction of the statute is too narrow,
and that voluntary as well as involuntary nonsuits are within its beneficient
operation.
The cited dictum in the Cero case misled the lower courts of Ohio into thinking that the
rule of Siegfried had been abandoned, as the Court of Appeals for Franklin County put it
in Beckner v. Stover, 13 Ohio App. 2d 222, 224, 235 N.E.2d 536, 538 (10th Dist. 1968):
The court in Cero quoted with approval from 86 A.L.R. 1051 to the effect that
a distinction between involuntary and voluntary nonsuit "has been held almost
without exception" to be too narrow. An exception is the Siegfried case. In our
opinion, Siegfried is no longer the law of Ohio. Any voluntary nonsuit or
dismissal under Section 2323.05(A), Revised Code, qualifies an action as one
which "fails" within the meaning of Section 2305.19, Revised Code.
4 The Supreme Court set the record straight in Beckner v. Stover, 18 Ohio St. 2d 36, 247
N.E.2d 300 (1969), when it said, at 40 (247 NE.2d at 302):
In short, the Cero case did not renounce the basic thrust of Siegfreid [sic.), which
was that "a failure in the action, by the plaintiff, otherwise than upon the
merits, imports some action by the court, by which the plaintiff is defeated
without a trial upon the merits." (Emphasis added.) Siegfreid [sic.), supra at
296. To hold otherwise would be to establish a rule whereby litigants could
substitute a voluntary dismissal without prejudice for an appeal from claimed
errors occurring during a trial. Under such a practice, parties could try and retry
their causes indefinitely until the most favorable circumstances for submission
were finally achieved. In our opinion, Section 2305.19, neither provides for nor
permits such a practice.
5Cero Realty Corp. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 82, 167 N.E.2d 774
(1960).
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with his case. Furthermore, if the "adverse ruling" goes to a technical
point of practice or procedure, and not to the substance of the case,
the subsequent voluntary dismissal is a failure "otherwise than upon
the merits," so that the action may be refiled within a year of the
dismissal if the dismissal took place after the statute of limitations
had run. These elements constitute what will hereinafter be referred
to as the Siegfried-Cero-Beckner rule.
None of this, of course, provides a solution for the problem
presented when the voluntary dismissal is taken before the expiration
of the statute of limitations, and that statute runs before the plaintiff
has an opportunity to refile, since the savings statute is not applicable
to such a situation. 6 Further, the determination of when a dismissal
is "otherwise than upon the merits" has produced some rather inter-
esting results. A dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction
is, for example, "otherwise than upon the merits,"7 but a dismissal
for lack of in personam jurisdiction,6 or for improper venue, 9 is not.
In any case, the pre-Rule courts would, in most instances, grant
the motion to dismiss and deny the plaintiff an opportunity to refile
his action.
The Enigma of Rule 41(A)
With the advent of the Civil Rules, section 2323.05 of the Ohio
Revised Code was replaced by Rule 41. In the part pertinent to our
inquiry, that Rule reads:
(A) Voluntary dismissal: Effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. . . . [A]n action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (a) by
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the commence-
ment of trial unless a counterclaim which cannot remain
pending for independent adjudication by the court has been
served by the defendant .... Unless otherwise stated in the
notice of dismissal . . . , the dismissal is without prejudice,
except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
6Uhas v. New York Cent. R.R., 70 Ohio App. 464, 46 NXE.2d 677 (1942). The court
said:
It will be noted when the action was dismissed by the plaintiff in November
1938, the two-year limitation provided for the bringing of such action under
Section 11224-1, General Code [OHIO REV. CODE 2305.101 had not yet expired;
therefore, Section 11233, General Code [OHIO REv. CODE 2305.19), the statute
titled "Saving in case of reversal," etc., did not apply, for that section by its
specific terms applies only when "the time limited for the commencement of
such action at the date of reversal or failure has expired," that is failure "other-
wise than upon the merits" (emphasis added).
Id. at 466, 46 N.E.2d at 678.
7 Wasyk v. Trent, 174 Ohio St. 525, 191 N.E.2d 58 (1963).
1 Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St. 2d 212, 217 NXE.2d 213 (1966).
9Timens v. Bernard Pipe Line Co., 4 Ohio App. 2d 249, 212 N.E.2d 73 (9th Dist. 1965).
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upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dis-
missed in any court, an action based on or including the
same claim.
The question then becomes: if the voluntary dismissal is taken
after the statute of limitations has run, may the plaintiff refile his
action at least once under the terms of Rule 41(A) (1), or is the
refiling barred by the prior judicial interpretation of the word "fail"
in the savings statute?
Suprisingly enough, the Rules Advisory Committee Staff Note"
leaves the question unresolved. It reads:
If plaintiff voluntarily dismisses without a court order
under Rule 41 (A) (1) after the applicable statute of limita-
tions has run for his particular action, has he failed other-
wise than on the merits and may he file over again under the
"savings statute"? The answer is not clear; hence plaintiff
would be taking a dangerous chance. See, Cero Realty Corp.
v. American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co., et al., 171 Ohio
St. 82 (1960).
The two authorities who have commented directly on the point
are divided in their answer. Dean McCormac suggests that the pre-
Rule decisional authority is still applicable, and refiling should not
be permitted, but Professor Jacoby12 holds that "logic and reason"
would dictate the opposite result. Milligan 3 does not expressly take
a position, but merely notes the previous Ohio decisions which have
held that a voluntary dismissal is not a "failure" of the action and
thus, by implication, supports McCormac's view.
As one might expect, case authority is, as yet, rather sparse.
Dictum in Howard v. Allen14 cites the Siegfried-Cero-Beckner rule
for the proposition that ". . . a voluntary dismissal is not a failure
otherwise than upon the merits within the meaning of R.C. 2305.19,"
and thus suggests that the pre-Rule interpretation of the statute is
still in effect.
The Brookman Solution
The one case directly on point is Brookman v. Northern Trading
Co.1s Here, plaintiff timely filed his action but, after the statute of
limitations had run, voluntarily dismissed it by notice of dismissal,
10 OHIO REV. CODE ANN., Civil Rules, 183-84 (Page 1971).
11J. MCCORMAC, OHIO CIVIL RULES PRACTICE, WITH FORMS §13.03, at 319 (1970).
121 S. JACOBY, OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES 375 (1970).
13 4 W. MILLIGAN, OHIO FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE 41-15 (1971).
1428 Ohio App. 2d 275, 277 N.E.2d 239 (10th Dist. 1971).
Is33 Ohio App. 2d 250, 294 N.E.2d 912 (10th Dist. 1972).
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which specifically stated that the dismissal was without prejudice.
When the action was refiled at a later date, defendant moved to
dismiss it on the ground that it had not been brought within the
time limited by law for the commencement of the action. The trial
court granted the motion on the ground that the previous voluntary
dismissal of the case was not a failure otherwise than upon the merits
within the meaning of the savings statute. Plaintiff appealed, and
the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Essentially, plaintiff argued that the plain language of Civil
Rule 41(A) (1) gave him a clear and unqualified right to refile his
action at least once, whether or not the statute of limitations had
run. If the prior judicial interpretations of the savings statute were
applied to it, then the savings statute is in conflict with Rule
41(A) (1), and to that extent, the statute has been repealed by the
language of Article IV, Section 5 (B) of the Ohio Constitution, which
reads:
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further
force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
The court of appeals premised its rejection of this argument on
four more or less separate grounds, the first two of which deal with
the implied repeal of §2305.19, while the third and fourth go to the
continued applicability of the Siegfried-Cero-Becker interpretation
of the word "fail" as it is used in that statute. The court's arguments
may be summarized as follows:
First, Amended House Bill 120116 repealed a large number of
statutes in conflict with the Civil Rules, but §2305.19 was not one
of those so repealed. Thus, it is not in conflict with the Civil Rules.
Second, there is no evidence to indicate that Rule 41 (A) (1) was
intended to directly limit the operation of §2305.19. Rather, it would
appear that the intention of the draftsmen of the rule was to limit
16 133 LAws OF OHIO 3017 (1970). The complete text of Section 3 of Amended House
Bill 1201 is as follows:
That the taking effect of the Rules of Civil Procedure on July 1, 1970, is prima-
facie evidence that the sections of the Revised Code to be repealed by Section
are in conflict with such rules and shall have no further force or effect, except
that for the purposes of depositions in criminal cases under section 2945.54 of
the Revised Code, procedures adopted by reference to sections 2319.05 to 2319.31,
inclusive, of the Revised Code, shall continue effective without change, unless
a court shall determine that one of such sections, or some part thereof, has
clearly not been superseded by such rules and that in the absence of such section
or part thereof being effective, there would be no applicable standard of
procedure prescribed by either statutory law or rule of court. The failure to repeal
or amend any other section establishes no evidence concerning its conflict with
such rules.
For a history and explanation of the Bill, see Puckett, Effect of the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure on Existing Statutes, 43 OHIo BAR, No. 29, at 835 (July 20, 1970).
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voluntary dismissals to a single dismissal without prejudice and, as
the previously quoted staff note indicates, they were uncertain as to
the effect of §2305.19 on Rule 41(A) (1).
Third, Howard v. Allen,17 a post-Rule decision, applies the
Beckner rationale to this very situation, and thus affirms its post-
Rule viability.
Fourth, the Beckner decision clearly affirms prior decisional
authority to the effect that a voluntary dismissal is not a "failure"
as that term is used in §2305.19. The Supreme Court was aware of
that decision when it amended the Civil Rules in 1971 and 1972, and
had the Court intended that decision not apply to Rule 41(A) (1),
it could have clarified the rule by amendment. But it did not, even
though it otherwise amended Rule 41 in 1971. Therefore, it must
be concluded that no exception was intended.
Critique of Brookman
The Failure to Expressly Repeal §2305.19
Despite the fact that the court describes this argument as "much
more significant" than its other arguments, it remains singularly
unconvincing. As the court itself pointed out, 18 Section 3 of Amended
House Bill 1201 specifically provides that any of the Code Sections
repealed by Section 1 of the bill may survive in whole or in part if
it is found that in the absence of such survival "there would be no
applicable standard of procedure prescribed by either statutory law
or rule of court." But if an expressly repealed statute can survive
at least in part because it is necessary to fill a gap in procedure, then
the converse must also be true: an existing statute may be impliedly
repealed in part because it is no longer necessary and, because of a
conflict with a rule, creates an inconsistent duplication in procedure.
That this may indeed be the case is evidenced by the last sentence
of Section 3 of the bill, which reads: "failure to repeal or amend any
other section establishes no evidence concerning its conflict with such
rule." Thus, an unrepealed or unamended statute might still be wholly
or partially in conflict with a Rule and, to that extent, repealed by
implication. Accordingly, the fact that §2305.19 was not expressly
repealed "establishes no evidence concerning its conflict" with Rule
41 (A) (1).19
1728 Ohio App. 2d 275, 277 N.E.2d 239 (10th Dist. 1971).
18 33 Ohio App. 2d at 255, 294 N.E.2d at 915-16.
19 As Professor Harper notes in 4 ANDERSON'S OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE, §147.01, at 37
(1973):
Of course, many statutes in obvious conflict with the Civil Rules and which
ought to have been repealed, were not repealed. Section 3 of House Bill 1201
recognizes the fact and provides: "The failure to repeal or amend any other
(Continued on next page)
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The Intent of the Draftsmen
This second argument is more difficult. Basically, its thrust is
two-pronged: 1. There is no evidence to indicate that the rule was
intended to limit the operation of the savings statute, and 2. the
intent of the draftsmen was to limit voluntary dismissals to a single
dismissal without prejudice, and this latter point is supported by
the staff note concerning the uncertain effect of the Cero decision on
the taking of a first voluntary dismissal after the statute of limita-
tions had run.
First of all, it would be inappropriate for the rule to expressly
state which sections of the Revised Code, if any, it was superseding.
In addition, the problem is likely to arise only with those actions
governed by the shorter statutes of limitations rather than the longer
ones, and any express language exempting Rule 41(A) (1) from the
operation of §2305.19 would not be needed in all cases. Thus, it would
be inappropriate to create ambiguity by including in the rule language
that would be applicable to some, but not all, cases to which it applied.
Accordingly, one is bound to fail if he searches the rule for express
language limiting the operation of the savings statute.
However, the limitation does appear by implication from the
language of the rule. The first voluntary dismissal by notice is char-
acterized as "without prejudice"; that is, the taking of the voluntary
dismissal will not bar another action on the same claim or cause of
action. But the second voluntary dismissal by notice is characterized
as an adjudication "upon the merits." The taking of the second vol-
untary dismissal by notice raises the bar of res judicata to another
action on the same claim. Since the first voluntary dismissal does not
raise the bar of res judicata, it must follow that the first voluntary
(Continued from preceding page)
section establishes no evidence concerning its conflict with such rules." In short,
for some time to come it will be up to the practitioners and the courts to follow
the Civil Rules and ignore conflicting procedural statutes still remaining in the
Revised Code.
Again, in the first paragraph of his preface to OHIO REV. CODE ANN., Civil Rules,
(Page 1971), he says:
The Civil Rules supersede many Ohio procedural statutes, modify others and
depend by direct or indirect reference upon still other Ohio procedural statutes
(emphasis added).
And Puckett states:
It therefore appears (except as to any rule which might purport to have a
prohibited effect on a substantive right) that any portion of the Revised Code
which "conflicts" with the Rules was effectively superseded on July 1, 1970,
without any action of the General Assembly. This follows from the fact that
the 108th General Assembly adjourned sine die on June 26, 1970, without
having adopted the concurrent resolution of disapproval which would have been
necessary to prevent the taking effect of the Rules of Civil Procedure (emphasis
added).
See Puckett, supra note 16, at 836.
1974]
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dismissal is not upon the merits; it is "otherwise than upon the
merits." From this the second implication follows: one who vol-
untarily dismisses by notice "fails otherwise than upon the merits" if
it is his first dismissal, but fails "on the merits" if it is his second
dismissal of the same claim. From this juxtaposition of "without
prejudice" and "adjudication upon the merits" the intent of the
draftsmen becomes apparent: a party is entitled to one completely
"free" voluntary dismissal by notice, whenever taken. Of course, to
say that this intent limits the savings statute itself is to say too much,
for there is nothing inconsistent between this view and the language
of the savings statute; the two are in harmony. Rather, it would be
more correct to say that this implied limitation is on the judical
interpretation of the savings statute, and not on the statute itself.2 0
Again, a similar limitation appears from an application of Rule
41(A) (1). Suppose that prior to the running of the statute of lim-
itations, plaintiff files notice of his voluntary dismissal without prej-
udice, and then refiles his action. Now, after the statute has run, he
again files notice of his voluntary dismissal without prejudice in
response to an adverse ruling of the trial court which prevented him
from going forward to a trial on the merits. Under the Siegfried-
Cero-Beckner rule, this second voluntary dismissal would be a failure
otherwise than upon the merits and, under the provisions of §2305.19,
he could refile a third time if the refiling was within a year of the
second voluntary dismissal. But under Rule 41 (A) (1), this third
refiling would be denied him, because the second voluntary dismissal
would be an adjudication upon the merits. Thus, in this instance, the
language of Rule 41 (A) (1) not only limits the judicial interpretation
of §2305.19, but it also renders inapplicable the definition of "merits"
found in the Cero decision. 1
20 As Judge Corrigan put it:
In the words of the first rule ,"these rules shall be construed and applied to
effect just results by eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and other impediments
to the expeditious administration of justice." This language summarizes the
guiding principles followed by the lawyers who have labored in the adoption
of the new rules and whose purpose was to formulate such procedure as will
promote the speedy trial of cases and substantially eliminate the disposition of
cases on technical grounds, without consideration of the merits.
See J. Corrigan, A Look at the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 OHIo BAR, No. 24,
(June 15, 1970) at 727-28. An application of the Siegfried-Cero-Beckner rule would not
"eliminate the disposition of cases on technical grounds, without consideration of the
merits"; it would do the very opposite.
21 Cero Realty Corp. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 82, 167 N.E.2d 774
(1960). Paragraph 2 of the Court's syllabus reads:
Where the word, "merits," is used in speaking of the determination of an action
upon the merits, it embraces the consideration of substance, not of form; of
legal rights, not of mere defects of procedure or practice or the technicalities
thereof.
There is nothing in the Beckner decision that would indicate a departure from this
portion of the Cero decision.
[Vol. 23:215
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Yet it can be argued that the phrase "adjudication upon the
merits" was intended to accomplish the prime goal of limiting vol-
untary dismissals to one, and was not intended to limit the judicial
interpretation of the savings statute. However, in the instance cited,
the prime purpose of the rule (assuming it to be such) could not be
achieved unless that interpretation was limited. Thus, it can be con-
cluded that the draftsmen used that language to specifically render
inapplicable the Siegfried-Cero-Beckner rule in a case such as this,
and thus limit the savings statute.22 Accordingly, it cannot be said
beyond peradventure of doubt that there is nothing in the rule intended
to limit the judicial interpretation of §2305.19. Indeed, the opposite
conclusion would appear to be more correct.
This view, of course, conflicts with the precise holding of
Beckner, but it does not conflict with the spirit of that decision. There
the Court sought to limit the taking of voluntary dismissals in order
to prevent parties from trying and retrying "their causes indefinitely
until the most favorable circumstances for submission were finally
achieved." 23
Under the Code, the goal of curbing voluntary dismissals could
only be achieved in limited circumstances, 24 but Rule 41 (A) (1)
achieves the goal in all circumstances by permitting only one really
"free" voluntary dismissal - the first voluntary dismissal by notice.
25
Consider the following:
1. If the first and second voluntary dismissals by notice are
both taken before the statute of limitations runs, a second refiling
before the running of the statute is barred because the second vol-
untary dismissal, as an adjudication on the merits, is res judicata.
22 Here, also, is an instance where the application of the language of the rule would lead
to the elimination of delay and the speedy trial on the merits which Judge Corrigan
saw as the guiding principles of the draftsmen. The application of the Siegfried-Cero
Beckner rule would again achieve an opposite result. See Corrigan, supra note 20.
23 18 Ohio St. 2d at 40, 247 N.E.2d at 303.
24 Under the Code, nothing could be done to curb voluntary dismissals and refilings occurring
before the statute of limitations had run, since §2323.05 provided for unlimited voluntary
dismissals in that situation. If the voluntary dismissal took place before the statute had
run, but the refiling afterward, the matter was either in limbo, because no statute applied
to it, or the second action was barred because the statute of limitations had run, and the
saving statute did not save it, the dismissal not having taken place after the statute
had run. (Apparently, this precise question has never been resolved.) But if the voluntary
dismissal and the refiling both took place after the statute had run, the second action
could be barred by judicial construction which limited the word "fail" as used in §2305.19.
Thus, under the Code, this latter is the only instance in which voluntary dismissals could
be controlled.
2SThe words "by notice" must be emphasized, since Rule 41 also permits voluntary dis-
missals by stipulation and pursuant to motion. If the second voluntary dismissal is by
stipulation or pursuant to motion, it is not an "adjudication upon the merits." However,
such voluntary dismissals will not be easily obtained, and the mere possibility of such an
event does not detract from the limiting purpose of the rule. That purpose is stated thus:
This "two dismissal" rule, as it is called, was intended to prevent delays and
harassment by plaintiff securing numerous dismissals without prejudice.
9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §2368, at 187 (1971).
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2. If the first and second voluntary dismissals by notice are
both taken before the statute of limitations runs, a second refiling
after the running of statute is barred because the second voluntary
dismissal, as an adjudication on the merits, is res judicata. Thus
the lacuna existing under the Code is disposed of.
3. If the first voluntary dismissal by notice takes place before the
running of the statute, and the second voluntary dismissal by notice
after the running of the statute, a second refiling is barred by the
statute of limitations because the second voluntary dismissal, as an
adjudication on the merits, takes the case out of the express language
of the savings statute. Under the Siegfried-Cero-Beckner rule this
effect might or might not be achieved, depending upon what action
the trial court had taken prior to the second voluntary dismissal. In
any case, this effect is achieved under the Rule by substituting the
fiat of "adjudication upon the merits" for the Cero court's definition
of "merits."
4. If the first and second voluntary dismissals by notice are both
taken after the statute of limitations runs, a second refiling is barred
because the second voluntary dismissal, as an adjudication upon the
merits" formulation in Code §2305.19, and the addition of the word
in curbing voluntary dismissals, and its uniformity of application, can
only be achieved if the Siegfried-Cero-Beckner interpretation of the
word "fails" is rejected. If it is not, the first voluntary dismissal by
notice is not a "failure," and the savings statute has no application.
And if that should be the case, the uniform application of the rule in
all instances is destroyed, and the rule is, to that extent, frustrated.
In sum, then, if Rule 41 is to have the desired effect of permitting,
in all instances, only one completely "free" voluntary dismissal, and
no more, it must limit the judicial interpretation of the savings
statute in two ways: first, it must abrogate the Cero definition of
"merits," and second, it must abrogate the Siegfried-Cero-Beckner
definition of "failure." The former it does expressly; the latter it does
by implication.
If it could do the former by express words, however, why could
it not also do the latter? The abrogation of the Cero definition of
"merits" lent itself to the use of express language; all that was required
was the deletion of two words, "otherwise than", from the "upon the
merits, is res judicata. Here, of course, the salutary effect of the rule
"adjudication." Thus, the rejection of the Cero definition was achieved
simply by negating the existence of the condition precedent to re-
filing found in the savings statute. The Rule formulation of "adjudica-
(Vol. 23:215
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tion upon the merits" does this without any confusion and without
any departure from its federal counterpart.2 6
Abrogation of the Siegfried-Cero-Beckner rule of "failure" is
not so favored. Additional language, and not a simple reformulation,
would be required and, unless that language attempted to distinguish
in some way between purely voluntary dismissals and "voluntary"
dismissals in response to an adverse ruling of a trial court which
prevented a trial on the merits, it might fall prey to the very inter-
pretation it sought to exclude. Not only would such language require
a significant departure from Rule 41's federal counterpart (which
departures the draftsmen sought to keep to a minimum both sub-
stantively and formally), but it would also require a number of "ifs",
"ands" and "buts" which could only lead to confusion in interpretation.
Thus, the best way to accomplish this latter abrogation was to
so state the rule that on first reading it clearly gives the dismissing
party one completely free dismissal, whenever taken, and to leave the
abrogation to flow from that statement by implication.
But if that is what the draftsmen did, then why the uncertainty
expressed in the previously quoted staff note? At this point, it might
be well to take another look at the Advisory Committee's language.
Rule 41(A) (1) and voluntary dismissal without prejudice
by plaintiff without a court order before commencement of
trial may be limited by court interpretation of the "savings
statute," §2305.19, RC. (Emphasis added).
Thus, the uncertainty is not with respect to the intention of the
framers of the rule; they intended that the plaintiff have one free
voluntary dismissal whenever taken. Rather, the uncertainty exists
with respect to the Supreme Court's commitment to the Siegfried-
Cero-Beckner rule of interpretation. Although that interpretation is
no longer necessary to achieve the purpose stated in Beckner - the
26 In pertinent part, Federal Rule 41 (a) (1) reads:
Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal
is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court
of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the same
claim.
That the Federal Rules were chosen as models is evidenced by Judge Corrigan's statement:
The committee followed the suggestion of the Supreme Court and used the
Federal Rules as an outline and used the same numerical designations with such
modifications, omissions and supplements as deemed necessary or desirable.
The whole objective was to promote the efficient administration of justice
by updating the rules governing civil procedure in Ohio courts. A careful
study, rule by rule, was made in comparison with Ohio's existing rules, before
the adoption of any new rule. The committee was convinced of the distinct
advantage in using the federally adopted rules as a model since there is a
considerable body of decisions in the federal courts interpreting and applying
these rules, and also in the majority of the states which have adopted similar rules.
See J. Corrigan, supra note 20, at 728-29.
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curbing of voluntary dismissals - it might still be imposed on Rule
41 (A) (1), and thus destroy its uniformity of application. It is to
this danger that the practitioner's attention is drawn. The Advisory
Committee proposes, but the Supreme Court disposes.27
Accordingly, the Brookman court's second argument, like its
first, is not wholly compelling. It is true that the framers of Rule
41 (A) (1) primarily intended to limit the possibilty of continuing
voluntary dismissals, but permitting one voluntary dismissal and
refiling after the statute of limitations had run does not conflict with
this goal, and it does not follow that the draftsmen did not intend
to authorize one voluntary dismissal and a refiling under the provisions
of the savings statute. Rather, the reverse is true, to the extent that
the savings statute has application in a given instance, for the uniform
application of the rule would require such a result.
From all of the above, of course, it is clear that there is no
inherent conflict between the express language of Rule 41(A) (1)
and the express language of §2305.19; the conflict exists between
the express language of Rule 41 (A) (1) and the previous judicial
interpretation of the savings statute. Thus, there is no need to find
that §2305.19 has been repealed in whole or in part by Rule 41 (A) (1),
since the two may comfortably coexist; but there is a need to examine
the continued viability of the Siegfried-Cero-Beckner rule of inter-
pretation. And that brings us to Brookman's third and fourth
arguments.
The Authority of Howard v. Allen
To be sure, Howard v. Allen, a post-Rule decision, does reaffirm
the Siegfried-Cero-Beckner rule, but it does so in dictum in the nature
of an aside, in which the rule is used as an example to illustrate
another point.28 It is doubtful, therefore, whether the court gave the
same serious consideration to the point that it would have if the
27 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO STATEMENT CONCERNING OHIO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE STAFF NOTES:
These Staff Notes were prepared and revised over a considerable period of
time for the use of the Rules Advisory Committee and its subcommittees. Although
the Supreme Court of Ohio used the Staff Notes as background for their
deliberations on the Rules, it should be emphasized that they are Staff Notes
and that where the Notes interpret the law, describe present conditions or
predict future practices they are the views of the Rules Advisory Committee
Staff and not those of the Supreme Court.
Reported in OHIO REV. CODE ANN., Civil Rules, at xi (Page 1971).
0 The full text of the dictum is as follows:
It might be noted that some distinction must be made in regard to a failure
upon the merits or otherwise than upon the merits with regard to the
applicability of R.C. 2305.19 and the applicability of the doctrine of resjudicata. For example, a voluntary dismissal is not a failure otherwise than upon
the merits within the meaning of R.C. 2305.19. Beckner v. Stover (1969),
18 Ohio St. 2d 36. However, such voluntary dismissal would ordinarily not
be res judicata.
[Vol. 23:215
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applicability of the rule had been the question at bar. There is a
substantial difference between the product of mature reflection and
an illustrative point taken from a judge's storehouse of memory and
put as an example.
Further, the Howard court and the Brookman court are one and
the same, although a partially different panel sat on each case.29 Thus,
in citing Howard, the Brookman court was merely citing itself rather
than a distinctly separate authority which has come to an identical
conclusion. It is, in a sense, "boot-strapping." Accordingly, the court's
third argument is more in the nature of a make-weight than any-
thing else.
The Supreme Court's Failure to Amend the Rule
That leaves the fourth argument which, in substance, is this:
had the Supreme Court intended that Rule 41 (A) (1) abrogate its
prior interpretation of the word "fail" in §2305.19, it could have
clarified the matter when it amended Rule 41 in 1971, and again when
it made other amendments to the Rules in 1972. But it did not, and
therefore it must be supposed that no abrogation was intended.
That is a two-edged argument, and it can cut both ways. Thus,
it might be said that the "statutory" scheme of Rule 41 (A) (1) -
that a party is entitled to one completely free voluntary dismissal
whenever taken- was so apparent on the face of the rule that no
clarification was required.
But, it will be said, the Howard and Brookman decisions refute
this argument. The very fact of their existence called for an amend-
ment if the decisions were not in accord with the Supreme Court's
intent. However, the chronological relationship between these decisions
and the 1971 and 1972 amendments was such that no correction of
their views could appear in the amendments. 3 In any case, amend-
ment of the rules is hardly an appropriate method for a Supreme
Court to use in correcting erroneous interpretations of those rules
by lower courts.
2 9The Howard decision was written by Judge Whitehead, with Judges Troop and Reilly
concurring. The Brookman decision was written by Judge Troop, with Judges Strasbaugh
and Holmes concurring.
30 The dictum in Howard v. Allen, the first reassertion of the old rule, was uttered on
August 17, 1971, and first appeared in print in 44 OHIo BAR, No. 50, dated December
27, 1971. But the 1971 amendments to the rules were submitted to the General Assembly
on January 15, April 14, and April 30, 1971, and became effective on July 1, 1971.
See Rule 86(B). Thus, the case did not appear until after the 1971 amendments had
become effective. The general amendments of 1972 were submitted to the General
Assembly for approval on January 15 and May 1, 1972. See Rule 86(C). Had the
Howard dictum come to the Supreme Court's attention prior to these latter submissions,
it might still have been too late to include a clarification in any plan of amendment.
Likewise, a disaffirmance of the Brookman decision could not have appeared in the
(Continued on next page)
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Thus, the Supreme Court's failure to clarify by amendment in
1971 and 1972 is inconclusive, unless it can be argued that the
uncertain staff note to Rule 41(A) (1) required such clarification.
But that staff note existed prior to the original enactment of the rules,
so that clarification, if required, should have been in the original text
of Rule 41 (A) (1) rather than in an amendment. Accordingly, the
failure to assert a clarification by amendment is insignificant.
However, the prior existence of the uncertain staff note raises
a more disturbing point. Surely, the very expression of uncertainty
itself called for a clarification; and would not the most proper place
for such clarification be in the original text of the rule? If the Supreme
Court had intended the abrogation of its prior decisional interpreta-
tion of "failure" would it not have spoken through the language
of the rule?
It did, to the extent it fairly could within the limits imposed upon
it by the nature of the rules themselves.
As we have seen when dealing with the Brookman court's second
argument, it was the draftsmen's intention to retire the Siegfried-
Cero-Beckner rule to the pre-Rule past since it would be wholly
unnecessary to achieve the Beckner objective in a post-Rule future.
But no simple reformulation of the language used in §2305.19 would
work this change as it had worked a change in the Cero definition
of "merits," nor would such a reformulation repeal the Siegfried-
Cero-Beckner rule as it had the rule of Mason v. Waters.31 A sub-
stantial departure from the language of the federal counterpart to
Rule 41 would be required, and this in itself was undesirable. Further,
there could be no guarantee that the language of explanation would
not fall victim to the same misinterpretation or, worse yet, give rise
to some unforeseen misconstruction of its own. Finally, the problem
would arise only in a limited number of cases, and it would not be
wise to engraft specific explanations on rules of general applicability.
Once that process was begun, there would be no end to it, and the
opportunity for confusion and misunderstanding would in itself be
limitless. Thus, the draftsmen did the only thing they could. They
(Continued from preceding page)
1973 amendments. Those amendments were submitted to the General Assembly on
January 12, 1973. See Rule 86(D). Although Brookman was decided on November
21, 1972, it did not first appear in print until March 19, 1973, in the OHIO BAR of that
date. (46 OHIo BAR, No. 12). Thus, the text of the decision was not available until
after the 1973 amendments to the rules had been submitted to the General Assembly.
316 Ohio St. 2d 212; 217 N.E.2d 213 (1966). In substance, Mason v. Waters held that
the dismissal of an action for lack of effective service of summons on the defendant
was not a "failure otherwise than upon the merits." Rule 41(B) (4) stipulates that a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over the person shall operate as a failure "otherwise
than on the merits." But see Howard v. Allen, 28 Ohio App. 2d 275, 277 N.E.2d 239
(10th Dist. 1971).
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stated their proposition simply and clearly, and left the repeal of
Siegfried-Cero-Beckner to implication. They warned, however, of the
danger inherent in such a solution.
The Supreme Court could do nothing to alleviate the danger. The
advisory Committee Staff Notes were not its own, so it could not
redraft them. Nor could it draft interpretive notes of its own with
propriety, since it cannot render advisory opinions; and in any case,
it neither had the time nor the staff for that purpose. Any attempt it
might have make to redraft the rule itself would have fallen foul
of the same inhibitors that frustrated the draftsmen. Therefore, the
only thing it could do was adopt the draftsmen's intent by adopting
the language of the rule, and leave clarification to the only appropriate
opportunity - when a case on point comes squarely before it. In
adopting the language of Rule 41(A) (1), the Supreme Court did
speak through the Rule, and in doing so, it accepted the draftsmen's
intent that the Siegfried-Cero-Beckner rule of interpretation be put
aside.
Conclusion
The Brookman decision is a misinterpretation of the intent and
purpose of Rule 41 (A) ; it is an unnecessary throwback to the pre-
Rule past. Rule 41 (A) has changed the law with respect to voluntary
dismissals, and for good reason. No longer is there any need to impose
a judicial gloss upon the language of the savings statute, a gloss which
makes some voluntary dismissals more "voluntary" than others, and
which makes the application of the statute turn upon a subtlety with
which even the Supreme Court has had difficulty. If Rule 41 (A) is
read free of the Siegfried-Cero-Beckner gloss it will achieve uni-
formity and consistency in application, and will accomplish the goals
thought desirable in Beckner. It will curb the taking of voluntary dis-
missals, and the taking of such dismisals will be subject to the statutes
of limitation. 32 But if the gloss is not lifted from it, its application will
32 At 18 Ohio St. 2d 40, 247 NXE.2d 303, the Beckner court said:
It should be pointed out that we are not here concerned with Section
2323.05 (A), Revised Code, which dearly grants a plaintiff authority to dismiss
his action without prejudice at any time prior to its final submission to the jury
or court. However, the prosecution of new proceedings on a cause so dismissed
is governed by the applicable statute of limitations and may be barred thereby
except under the circumstances heretofore discussed.
The view urged here does not exempt "the prosecution of new proceedings on a cause
so dismissed" from the "applicable statute of limitations"; it merely puts the first
voluntary dismissal by notice taken after the running of the statute within the protective
language of the savings statute. It must be remembered that all concede that such a
dismissal is "otherwise than upon the merits"; the quibble is whether or not such a
dismissal is a "failure" otherwise than upon the merits. The view that it is such a
(Continued on next page)
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be exceptional in some cases rather than uniform in all, and its
achievement will not be substantially greater than it would be with-
out the gloss. All that would be gained would be the denial of even
one voluntary dismissal in a small number of cases. That small gain
is not worth the corresponding loss of uniformity and consistency
in the application of the rule. The first voluntary dismissal by notice
pursuant to Rule 41 (A) is a failure otherwise than upon the merits
and, under the provisions of the Ohio Revised Code, section 2305.19,
plaintiff may refile his action within one year of the date of such
failure.
(Continued from preceding page)
failure does no violence to the meaning of the word "fail"; it simply gives it a broader
and more acceptable meaning. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 4th ed. (1951)
which gives the primary definition of "fail" as "fault, negligence, or refusal," and the
primary definition of "failure" as "abandonment or defeat." Surely, a voluntary dis-
missal is no more than a refusal to go forward, or an abandonment of the initial
prosecution.
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